IBN SINA I39 from that deficiency. And its perfection is what is meant by (God's) "satisfaction" with it, its "closeness" and "nearness" and "attachment." This, then, and nothing else is the meaning of "Reward" and "Punishment," in the view of the ancients.
(3) The third premise is that the resurrection is only the return of human souls to their own world : this is why God the Exalted said, " 0 tranquil soul, return to your Lord satisfied and satisfactory."
These are summary statements which need to be supported by demonstrative arguments.
If these premises are established, we say (a) that the apparent evils which occur in this world are, on a sound judgement, not purposed (by God) for the world; only good is purposed, while evil is privation. (b) But according to Plato both are purposed as well as willed; and the commandments and prohibitions given to the world with respect to the acts of responsible beings are just stimulants to those of whom it is foreknown (by God) that they will perform what is commanded, and deterrents to those of whom it is foreknown that they will refrain from what is forbidden. Thus the commandment is a cause of the act's proceeding from him of whom it is foreknown that it will proceed, and the prohibition is a cause of intimidation to him who refrains as a result of it from something base. Without the commandment the first agent would not have been stimulated; without the prohibition the second would not have been scared. H e (Plato) imagined that there was an (initial) potentiality of 100 % of corruption occurring in the absence of any prohibition and that with the intervention of prohibitions 50 $% of corruption has occurred, whereas without prohibitions 100 % would have occurred. He viewed commandments in the same way: had there been no commandments nothing of righteousness would have occurred, but with the supervening of Commandments 50 % of righteousness has resulted.
(c) As for praise and blame, these have only two objects. One is to incite the doer of good 3 to repeat the like act which it is willed should occur from him; while blame scares the one from whom the act has issued from repeating the like of it, and (ensures) that the one from whom that act might issue will abstain from doing something which is within his capacity to do but which it is not willed should proceed from him.
(d) It is not admissible that Reward and Punishment could be such as the theologians suppose: requital of the fornicator, for example, by putting him in chains and shackles, burning him in the fire over and over again, and setting snakes and scorpions upon him. For this is the behavior of one who wills to slake his wrath against his enemy, through injury or pain befalling him in consequence of his wrongdoing against himself (the avenger); and that is impossible in the character of God the Exalted, or that He should so visit( ?) 4 one whom He willed to refrain from such behavior 5 OT to be restrained from repeating it. And it is not to be imagined that after the resurrection obligations should be imposed, with commandments and prohibitions for anyone, so that he should be scared or refrain as a result of the Reward and Punishment that he has lvitnessed, as they have imagined.
(e) As for the sanctions established by the divine law for those who commit offenses, they have the same effect as a prohibition, which restrains him who abstains from the offense, whereas but for the prohibition it is conceivable that the act might issue from him. Sanctions may also be useful in preventing him from some other act of corruption, and because men must be bound by one of two bonds, either the bond of the divine law or the bond of reason, in order that the world may be completed. Do you not see that if anyone were loosed from both bonds the corruption he would commit would be intolerable, and the order of the world's affairs would be upset because of his release from both boncls ? But God is more knowing and wiser. 
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